

Sep 30, 2019

SEAN F. McAVOY, CLERK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

PAUL KIZA WAUSA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVENPORT GRAND HOTEL,

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-00008-SAB

**ORDER GRANTING  
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissal, ECF No. 78, Motion to Strike, ECF No. 104, and related Motion to Expedite, ECF No. 103. A hearing on Defendant's Motions was held on September 26, 2019.<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff represented himself<sup>2</sup> and Defendant was represented by Susan C. Nelson and Mary Palmer.

<sup>1</sup> After Defendant gave its oral arguments and Plaintiff was given an opportunity to respond, Plaintiff indicated he was unable to hear the arguments. At no time prior to this time did Plaintiff indicate he could not hear, nor did he request any accommodations. Plaintiff presented his responsive argument and he was able to respond to the Court's questioning and direction. The Court finds that Plaintiff waived his right for accommodation.

<sup>2</sup> Previously, the Court granted Plaintiff's request for counsel and local counsel volunteered to represent Plaintiff. Plaintiff was unable to establish an

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1 Plaintiff is suing his former employer, Defendant Davenport Grand Hotel.  
2 Previously, the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's  
3 Americans with Disability Act ("ADA"), Genetic Information Non-Discrimination  
4 Act ("GINA"), and Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claims.  
5 ECF No. 33. The only remaining claim is Plaintiff Title VI claim accusing  
6 Defendant of racial discrimination when he was fired from his job at the Davenport  
7 Grand Hotel. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on that claim.

8 Plaintiff filed numerous documents in response to the motion. The Court  
9 strikes those documents that were filed after Plaintiff filed his first response to  
10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as being in violation of the Court's  
11 Order, ECF No. 91, Notice to Pro Se Litigants of the Summary Judgment Rule  
12 Requirement.

### 13 **Motion Standard**

14 Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no  
15 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a  
16 matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is no genuine issue for  
17 trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to  
18 return a verdict in that party's favor. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S.  
19 242, 250 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence  
20 of a genuine issue of fact for trial. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 325  
21 (1986). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go  
22 beyond the pleadings and "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine  
23 issue for trial." *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248.

24 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving  
25 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Smith v. Univ. of*

26  
27 attorney/client relationship with his counsel. Plaintiff has adequately represented  
28 himself in these proceedings.

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1 *Wash. Law Sch.*, 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled  
2 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a  
3 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving  
4 party has the burden of proof. *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 323.

5 When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may neither  
6 weigh the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant  
7 is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”  
8 *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 255. That said, “[c]onclusory, speculative testimony in  
9 affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and  
10 defeat summary judgment.” *Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 509 F.3d 978, 984  
11 (9th Cir. 2007). “[W]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is  
12 blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a  
13 court should not adopt that version of the facts.” *Scott v. Harris*, 550 U.S. 372, 380  
14 (2007).

### 15 **Background Facts**

16 Plaintiff is a refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo who came to  
17 the United States in 2017. He was sponsored by World Relief Spokane.<sup>3</sup> His first  
18 job was washing dishes at the Defendant Davenport Hotel. He was interviewed by  
19 Sous Chef Robert Homuth and was hired by Executive Chef Ian Wingate. He  
20 worked there for 8 months—from August 2016 to April 2017, when he was  
21 terminated. Defendant maintains he was a problem employee who was “disruptive,  
22 insubordinate, disrespectful and combative.” Plaintiff maintains he was a model  
23 employee. He asserts that Chef Wingate approached him on the night when he  
24 refused to do his work and said, “Paul, you are black, you must do everything at  
25 \_\_\_\_\_

26 <sup>3</sup> World Relief Spokane is an organization that helps refugees resettle in the United  
27 States by assisting them with housing, cultural orientation, learning English,  
28 employment services, immigration, legal services and citizenship classes.

1 once.” His other allegation of racial discrimination was when he met with  
2 managers and they called him a dog and other derogatory names.

3 Over one-third of the workforce at the Davenport Hotels<sup>4</sup> brand is made up  
4 of persons of color. Over the past two decades, the Davenport Hotels have  
5 provided jobs for roughly 1,000 or more refugees. In 2018, the Davenport Hotels  
6 were jointly named World Relief Spokane Employer of the Year.

### 7 **Racial Discrimination Claim**

8 To establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must offer proof  
9 that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a class of persons protected by Title VII; (2) the  
10 plaintiff performed his or her job satisfactorily; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse  
11 employment action; and (4) the plaintiff’s employer treated the plaintiff differently  
12 than a similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same protected class  
13 as the plaintiff. *Cornwell v Electra Cent. Credit Union*, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th  
14 Cir. 2006) (citing *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).

15 Establishing a prima facie case under *McDonnell Douglas* creates a  
16 presumption that the plaintiff’s employer undertook the challenged employment  
17 action because of the plaintiff’s race. *Id.* To rebut this presumption, the defendant  
18 must produce admissible evidence showing that the defendant undertook the  
19 challenged employment action for a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” *Id.* If  
20 the defendant does so, then “the presumption of discrimination ‘drops out of the  
21 picture’” and the plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by satisfying the usual  
22 standard of proof required in civil cases under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). *Reeves v.*  
23 *Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.*, 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (citation omitted). In  
24 the context of employment discrimination law under Title VII, summary judgment  
25 is not appropriate if, based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could  
26 \_\_\_\_\_

27 <sup>4</sup> Defendant Davenport Grand Hotel is part of the Davenport Hotels brand,  
28 consisting of five different properties.

1 conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant undertook the  
2 challenged employment action because of the plaintiff's race. *Id.*

3 Where the same actors are responsible for both the hiring and firing and both  
4 actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was  
5 no discriminatory motive. *Coghlan v Am. Seafoods Co.*, 413 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th  
6 Cir. 2005).

### 7 **Analysis**

8 This case starts from the premise that there is a strong inference that no  
9 discriminatory motive factored in Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff. This  
10 is because not only did the person who hired Plaintiff also fire Plaintiff but the  
11 Davenport Hotels, who employed Plaintiff, have an exemplary record of hiring  
12 persons with color. Plaintiff is unable to overcome this strong inference. While  
13 Defendant provided abundant evidentiary support for its explanation that Plaintiff  
14 was terminated for reasons of insubordination and uncooperative behavior,  
15 Plaintiff has not provided any contrary evidence, or any evidence from which a  
16 justifiable inference could be made that he was terminated on account of his race.  
17 For instance, he has not provided any positive job evaluations, or statements from  
18 any co-workers regarding the work environment at the Davenport Hotels. Plaintiff  
19 cannot rely on his own conclusory statements to defeat summary judgment.

20 On the other hand, Defendant has shown that Plaintiff had been counseled  
21 on multiple occasions and was asked to improve his interactions with other  
22 employees, which he failed to do. He responded inappropriately when asked to  
23 perform routine tasks associated with his position. He was unable to work  
24 successfully around others and his situation was not improving, despite verbal and  
25 written warnings and counseling. He appeared unwilling to take direction from his  
26 managers/supervisors. There is nothing to suggest that Plaintiff was not treated  
27 fairly; rather, he was disciplined/counseled according to Defendant's standards and  
28 expectations.

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1 Simply put, Plaintiff's story is contradicted by the record. No reasonable  
2 jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant fired  
3 Plaintiff because of his race.

4 Accordingly, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:**

5 1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissal, ECF No. 78, is  
6 **GRANTED.**

7 2. Defendant's Motion to Strike, ECF No. 104, is **GRANTED.**

8 3. Defendant's Motion to Expedite, ECF No. 103, is **DENIED**, as moot.

9 4. The District Court Executive is directed to enter judgment in favor of  
10 Defendants and against Plaintiff.

11 5. The Court certifies that an appeal of this decision would not be in good  
12 faith.

13 **IT IS SO ORDERED.** The Clerk of Court is directed to enter this Order,  
14 forward copies to Plaintiff and counsel, and **close** the file.

15 **DATED** this 30th day of September 2019.



19  
20

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Stanley A. Bastian", is written over a horizontal line.

21 Stanley A. Bastian  
22 United States District Judge  
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28